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People working on a task can make errors along the way. How people deal with
an error, however, depends on the type of error approach they apply. One
approach, error management, focuses on increasing the positive and decreasing
the negative consequences of errors. A second approach, error prevention,
focuses on working faultlessly. In two experiments, we manipulated error
approach through task instructions and measured on-task thoughts and off-
task thoughts. In Experiment 1 (N = 78), error management resulted in more
on-task thoughts, but no differences were found for off-task thoughts. Experi-
ment 2 (N = 76) replicated the findings of Experiment 1, and further demon-
strated that error management resulted in better analogical and adaptive
transfer performance, and that these effects were mediated by on-task thoughts.
Our findings point toward the benefits of error management instructions for
people and organisations. Specifically, error management instructions make
people more focused on the task during practice, as indicated by on-task
thoughts, which in turn results in higher performance after practice.
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INTRODUCTION
People try to prevent errors because of the negative consequences they may
involve, such as stress, frustration, financial loss, and loss of lives (Reason,
1990). Because errors are inevitable (Reason, 1997), it is critical to develop
strategies that can help people to continue to pursue a goal after they commit
an error. In this way, errors can be effectively corrected, lowering the likeli-
hood of severe negative consequences, and leading to learning from errors,
which can eventually affect future task pursuit and result in higher-quality
outcomes and better performance (Van Dyck, Frese, Baer, & Sonnentag,
2005).
Errors are defined as “all those occasions in which a planned sequence of
mental or physical activities fails to achieve its intended outcome, and where
these failures cannot be attributed to the intervention of some chance
agency” (Reason, 1990, p. 9). Errors are characterised by three main features:
(1) they are unintentional, (2) they occur only in goal-directed action, and (3)
they are potentially avoidable (Frese & Zapf, 1994; Hofmann & Frese, 2011;
Reason, 1990).
Two main approaches to errors have been previously outlined: error pre-
vention and error management (e.g. Frese & Zapf, 1994; Hofmann & Frese,
2011). Although both approaches share the goal of minimising the negative
consequences of errors, the way that the two approaches achieve this goal
differs. Error prevention entails a relatively negative view of errors and aims
to prevent their negative consequences by avoiding errors altogether.
Although prevention can be important for reducing errors, it cannot com-
pletely eliminate them (Reason, 1997) and it does not prepare people for
proper error handling once an error has occurred. In addition, focusing only
on error prevention blinds individuals or organisations to the learning poten-
tial present in some errors (Sitkin, 1992).
Error management, in contrast, is based on the assumption that error
occurrence cannot be completely eradicated and that errors can have both
negative and positive consequences. Based on these assumptions, error man-
agement proposes that one should try to use errors in a constructive manner
by learning from them, as well as by attempting to reduce their negative
consequences. Error management thus tries to minimise the negative and
maximise the positive consequences of errors.
Research has shown that error management leads to better performance
than error prevention for both individuals and organisations (e.g. Keith &
Frese, 2008; Van Dyck et al., 2005). Less is understood, however, about the
underlying psychological mechanisms through which error approach affects
performance; that is, we are still unclear about why error management is
effective. Uncovering the mechanisms through which error approach affects
performance is important not only because it helps us understand the
theoretical underpinnings of the effects of error management on perfor-
mance, but also because knowing which mechanisms work can help with the
implementation of error management in practice.
Researchers have proposed three main mechanisms through which error
approach can affect performance: cognitive (e.g. metacognition, Bell &
Kozlowski, 2008; Keith & Frese, 2005), emotional (e.g. frustration,
Debowski, Wood, & Bandura, 2001; Wood, Kakebeeke, Debowski, & Frese,
2000; emotion control, Keith & Frese, 2005; anxiety, Bell & Kozlowski,
2008), and motivational (intrinsic motivation, Bell & Kozlowski, 2008;
Debowski et al., 2001; Wood et al., 2000; self-efficacy, Bell & Kozlowski,
2008; Debowski et al., 2001). In the current paper, we investigate how active/
exploratory practice of a novel complex task combined with instructions that
either advise people to prevent errors (error prevention) or to make and learn
from errors (error management) affect people’s cognitions and subsequent
performance. Specifically, we are interested in whether providing people with
an error management strategy during task practice benefits post-practice
performance by positively affecting people’s ability to stay on-task and mini-
mise task-undirected (off-task) thoughts.
We extend the work of Keith and Frese (2005), who implied that the
allocation of cognitive resources to on-task, off-task thoughts, and self-
regulation may mediate the effect of error approach on performance.
Although Keith and Frese (2005) established the mediating role of self-
regulation (metacognition and emotion control), no study so far has empiri-
cally tested on-task and off-task thoughts as mediators. Such a lack of
research is surprising as scholars have consistently suggested that the pres-
ence of off-task thoughts and the lack of on-task thoughts could negatively
affect performance (e.g. Heimbeck, Frese, Sonnentag, & Keith, 2003; Keith
& Frese, 2005; Nordstrom, Wendland, & Williams, 1998). Accordingly, our
first contribution to the literature is investigating whether the allocation of
cognitive resources to on-task and off-task thoughts mediates the effect of
error approach on performance.
Our second contribution involves disentangling the role of type of practice
and type of instructions. According to the error management training and the
active learning literatures (Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Hofmann & Frese, 2011;
Keith & Frese, 2005, 2008), errors during training, as a form of task explo-
ration, are helpful in themselves. We, however, argue that it is not erring itself
that helps people when practicing a new task. Rather, how errors are
approached makes a difference. By allowing all participants to make errors,
we address a limitation of prior work: the confounding of (a) exploratory
task practice (practice during which people can make errors) with error
management instructions and (b) step-by-step practice (practice during
which people cannot make errors) with error prevention instructions (Bell &
Kozlowski, 2008; Keith & Frese, 2008).
Our third contribution relates to investigating towhat extent even short task
practicewithminimal error approach instructions can affect performance.We
examine whether performance effects reported for extended training sessions
in previous research can be generalised to short task instructions. Systems and
tasks people face every day increase in complexity, while the time needed for
learning how to deal with themdiminishes. This creates an interesting paradox
in that people are expected to learn more than before in much less time.
Because it is not always possible to spend multiple hours on training,
optimising by decreasing the amount of time spent on learning, while main-
taining positive performance effects, is both important and practically rel-
evant. In contrast to previous research focusingmainly on longer training (e.g.
Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Dormann & Frese, 1994; Heimbeck et al., 2003;
Joung,Hesketh, &Neal, 2006;Nordstrom et al., 1998), we examine the effects
of brief errormanagement and error prevention instructions during practicing
a novel task. Note that we do not define our context as training or error
management training per se; rather, our experiments combine brief error-
framed (management or prevention) instructions and short task practice.
ON- AND OFF-TASK THOUGHTS
Making errors is disruptive for goal-directed action and, as such, is likely to
affect people’s cognitive processing by prompting an individual to stop and
think why an error has occurred or what its consequences may be (Ivancic &
Hesketh, 1995/1996). Kanfer and Ackerman’s (1989) cognitive resource allo-
cation theory states that people have limited attentional/cognitive resources.
These resources can be allocated to on-task thoughts, off-task thoughts, and
self-regulation (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989). At their core, on-task and off-
task thoughts entail attention toward versus away from the task at hand (e.g.
Sarason, Sarason, Keefe, Hayes, & Shearin, 1986). Self-regulation involves
(re)directing cognitive resources back to the task when one is experiencing
off-task thoughts (Keith & Frese, 2005).
On-task thoughts can be defined as attention directed towards the task and
task completion (e.g. thinking about the rules of the task) or as a form of
task-concentration and focused task-engagement (Smallwood, Obonsawin,
& Heim, 2003). On-task thoughts are theoretically and conceptually similar
to mental/cognitive focus (Lee, Sheldon, & Turban, 2003), which indicates
the capacity to stay focused on the activity one is currently engaged in.
Off-task thoughts, in contrast, involve allocating attention to task-undirected
thoughts (e.g. thinking about an appointment later this week). Thus, they
involve temporary attentional lapses during which “an individual’s attention
becomes temporarily disengaged from the task and is instead directed inter-
nally within participants” (Smallwood, Riby, Heim, & Davis, 2006, p. 220).
Kanfer and Ackerman’s (1989) cognitive resource allocation theory implies
that on-task thoughts are negatively related to off-task thoughts. Conse-
quently, the more off-task thoughts a person has, the less mental capacity
that person would have for on-task thoughts and vice versa. In other words,
off-task thoughts compete with on-task thoughts for limited cognitive
resources (Sarason et al., 1986).
ERROR APPROACH, ON-TASK THOUGHTS, AND
OFF-TASK THOUGHTS
Making an error during skill acquisition can guide one’s thoughts away from
the task and in this way jeopardise learning (Joung et al., 2006; Van Der
Linden, Sonnentag, Frese, & Van Dyck, 2001). Research has suggested that
suppressing negative thoughts or emotions is more draining than reapprais-
ing a negative event (Richards & Gross, 2000). Thus, suppressing one’s
thoughts after making an error (e.g. trying not to think that one is performing
poorly) is more cognitively costly than reappraising potential error situations
beforehand by reframing errors as learning opportunities. We expect that if
people apply an error management approach, they will be less prone to direct
attention to various possibly disruptive off-task thoughts than if people apply
an error prevention approach. Subsequently, error approach is expected to
influence the amount of cognitive resources one can spend on task-directed
(on-task) thoughts, making people with an error management approach less
likely to waste effort on off-task thoughts than people with an error preven-
tion approach. In other words, if people worry less about making errors,
because errors are framed positively, they have more cognitive resources
available for actively mastering the task. If one cannot reappraise errors as
positive learning opportunities, every new error indicates that one is getting
farther away from the goal of working faultlessly. As error prevention
instructions frame diligence and working faultlessly as beneficial, making an
error is expected to result in more negative off-task thoughts and fewer
on-task thoughts than error management.
Hypothesis 1: Error management leads to more on-task thoughts than error
prevention.
Hypothesis 2: Error management leads to fewer off-task thoughts than error
prevention.
PERFORMANCE
Research has shown that error management leads to better performance than
error prevention (Keith & Frese, 2008) because it increases positive
transfer—transferring previously learned knowledge or skills from one task
to another (Keith & Frese, 2005). In the current research we examine two
types of transfer-related performance: analogical and adaptive.
Analogical Transfer Performance
Analogical transfer “involves using a familiar problem to solving a problem
of the same type” (Ivancic & Hesketh, 2000, p. 1967). Analogical transfer
requires the direct application of a rule, skill, or a procedure that was learned
during practice. Encountering errors is expected to sensitise people to similar
errors in the future, which leads to an increased capacity to successfully
handle those and, as such, promotes analogical transfer (Ivancic & Hesketh,
2000). In addition, we argue that acquiring the necessary skills during task
practice would strongly depend not only on the making of errors per se but
also on the framing of errors, which can influence the extent to which people
can learn from the errors made.
Research on error approach has found small differences in analogical
transfer performance (see Keith & Frese, 2008). A possible explanation for
the small effects may be the coupling of error management instructions with
error-based training and error prevention instructions with errorless training,
both of which can independently lead to similar levels of analogical transfer
(for a discussion see Keith & Frese, 2008). We wanted to test whether error
management instructions would be more beneficial for analogical transfer
than error prevention instructions, while allowing all participants to make
errors. One can speculate that error management due to its reframing of
errors as challenges to master and learn from will help people acquire more
information from errors during task practice. Error prevention, in contrast,
frames errors as threats to working faultlessly. Because of this, people may
want to disengage from the error situation as quickly as possible, and con-
sequently learn less from errors than someone who reappraises errors as
learning opportunities.
Hypothesis 3: Error management leads to better analogical transfer performance
than error prevention.
Adaptive Transfer Performance
Adaptive transfer “involves using one’s existing knowledge base to change a
learned procedure, or to generate a solution to a completely new problem”
(Ivancic & Hesketh, 2000, p. 1968). Adaptive transfer requires people to
adapt to a new problem that structurally differs from those previously solved
during practice (Ivancic & Hesketh, 1995/1996). Ford, Smith, Weissbein,
Gully, and Salas (1998) explained that for training to be practically useful, it
should “prepare individuals to apply what was learned to more complex
situations than were experienced during training” (p. 220). Error manage-
ment involves learning how to handle unexpected complications and errors,
which makes it an especially effective strategy in instigating adaptive transfer
(Keith & Frese, 2005; 2008). In addition, by reframing errors as learning
opportunities, error management stimulates people to pay more attention to
the important information errors reveal and thus assists them in developing
better mental models of the task (Frese, Brodbeck, Heinbokel, Mooser,
Schleiffenbaum, & Thiemann, 1991).
Research consistently shows that error management has a beneficial effect
on adaptive transfer when compared to various alternative methods (e.g. Bell
& Kozlowski, 2008; Dormann & Frese, 1994; Heimbeck et al., 2003; Keith &
Frese, 2005). It is important, however, to replicate the effect of error man-
agement on adaptive transfer performance under conditions of short task
practice, to show the expected benefits of error management instructions over
error prevention instructions.
Hypothesis 4: Error management leads to better adaptive transfer performance
than error prevention.
Note that in our current theorising we differentiate between practice and
transfer performance. We only expect error management to lead to improved
performance after, but not during, practice itself. Encouraging people to
make errors during practice likely results in similar or inferior practice per-
formance of the error management group as compared to the error preven-
tion group. The distinction between performance during training/practice
and test/transfer performance is vital because manipulations that positively
affect training performance may negatively affect performance after training
and vice versa (Keith & Frese, 2005; Wood et al., 2000). Accordingly, meta-
analytic results show that error management is beneficial to transfer rather
than to training performance (Keith & Frese, 2008).
Finally, we hypothesise that the effects of error approach on analogical and
adaptive transfer performance aremediated by on-task and off-task thoughts,
such that error management results in better analogical and adaptive transfer
performance than error prevention because it induces more on-task thoughts
and fewer off-task thoughts.Althoughour predictions regardingmediationby
on- and off-task thoughts are theoretically grounded in prior research on error
approach (Keith & Frese, 2005; Joung et al., 2006), the current studies are the
first to testwhether thismechanism indeed clarifies the effect of error approach
on performance. Our conceptual model is outlined in Figure 1.
Hypothesis 5: On-task thoughts mediate the effect of error approach on (a) ana-
logical and (b) adaptive transfer performance.
Hypothesis 6: Off-task thoughts mediate the effect of error approach on (a)
analogical and (b) adaptive transfer performance.
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Participants and Design. The final sample consisted of 78 students at
the university of the first author and one non-student (36 females and 42
males; Mage = 21.05, SD = 3.21) who were recruited via flyers advertising the
study distributed in the university canteen. All participants were randomly
assigned to a two-group between-participant design with error manage-
ment and error prevention as conditions. All participants received €7 for
participation.
The error management group consisted of 24 males and 16 females. The
error prevention group consisted of 18 males and 20 females. Five partici-
pants were removed from the initial sample: Two due to problems with the
procedure during the experiment (one participant took 40 minutes longer to
finish the study, one participant responded without reading multiple items)
and three participants failed the manipulation check at the end of the
study.
Procedure. Participants were seated in separate cubicles and all instruc-
tions and questions were presented on a computer screen. The experiment
took approximately 60 minutes. We provided a brief description of the
purpose of the experiment as an investigation of strategic insight—the type of
strategic thinking people use while playing games.
|___________________________________________|
Experiment 1
|______________________________________________________________________|
Experiment 2
Error approach
(prevention vs.
management)
On-task thoughts
Off-task thoughts
Analogical 
transfer 
performance
Adaptive
transfer 
performance
FIGURE 1. Research model.
Manipulation. The error management manipulation was adapted from
Keith and Frese (2005), but shortened in a manner consistent with the error
management manipulation by Nordstrom et al. (1998). The error prevention
manipulation was self-developed, partially based on the error avoidant
instructions by Nordstrom et al. (1998). The manipulation texts were com-
parable in size and wording. Both management and prevention were framed
as good for learning and subsequent performance. Participants in the error
management condition read that “the occurrence of errors can be very useful
because a lot can be learned from errors since they point you towards things
you do not know” and that “people who learn how to deal with errors
succeed more”. In the error prevention condition the text stressed the impor-
tance of working without making errors and suggested that “people who
learn how to prevent errors succeed more”. The text stated that “people who
work meticulously and without errors perform better, which is why one
should try to think in advance of how to prevent errors”. The text also
suggested that one can learn a lot if one strives to work without errors. The
manipulations were reinforced by presenting three short statements on screen
(cf. Keith & Frese, 2005).
Game Task. We used the game Pingus© (Ruhnke, 2010), which is a
free-source LemmingsTM-inspired computer game. The game was appropri-
ate in the current context because making errors was highly likely and using
either an error management or an error prevention approach was possible.
The main objective of the game is to safely lead a group of penguins from the
beginning to the end of a level with as small a number of casualties as
possible. If not properly guided, the penguins venture into various deadly
situations (e.g. jumping off cliffs). In order to make sure a certain percentage
of penguins reaches the end of a level, the player must develop strategies by
using a set of functions that can be distributed to individual penguins.
Following the experimental manipulation, participants were introduced to
the goal of the game and to the game controls. After reading the instructions,
participants practiced the game for 25 minutes. During the allotted time
participants finished as many levels as possible. Everyone started from the
same basic level and could not go on to the next one until the current level
was completed successfully.
Dependent Variables. After playing the game for 25 minutes, partici-
pants filled in the measures of on- and off-task thoughts. All items were
measured on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much
so), unless mentioned otherwise.
On-task thoughts were measured with a self-developed six-item scale. A
sample item is: “I found it easy to concentrate on the task” (for all items see
Appendix). Cronbach’s alpha was .87.
Off-task thoughts: We measured self-evaluative off-task thoughts with six
items from Sarason et al.’s (1986) Cognitive Interference Questionnaire
(CIQ), which is a standard and widely used instrument for the assessment of
intrusive thoughts (for exact items see Appendix). General mind-wandering
was measured with two items: One from the original CIQ questionnaire, “To
what degree did your mind wander off the task?” and a self-developed item,
“While playing the game did you have any other things going through your
mind besides thoughts about the game (e.g. did you think about what you
will be doing later today, your friends or family, something you found funny,
some homework or assignment you should work on?)” Both scales had
adequate internal consistencies (α = .74 and α = .75, respectively).
Confirmatory factor analyses: As our on-task thoughts scale was newly
developed it was important to ascertain whether the scale had discriminant
validity when compared to the off-task thoughts scales. We conducted three
confirmatory factor analyses in EQS, using the maximum likelihood estima-
tion, in which all items were only allowed to load on their intended factor,
factors were allowed to correlate among each other, and errors were not
allowed to correlate. A three-factor model distinguishing between on-task
thoughts, self-evaluative off-task thoughts, and general mind-wandering
showed good fit, χ2(74, N = 78) = 95.77, p = .045, CFI = .95, SRMR = .07,
RMSEA = .06. A two-factor model distinguishing between on-task thoughts,
and combining self-evaluative off-task thoughts with general mind-
wandering fit the data significantly worse than the three-factor model, Δχ2(2)
= 30.41, p < .001, χ2(76, N = 78) = 126.18, p < .001, CFI = .88, SRMR = .08,
RMSEA = .09. Similarly, a single-factor model combining on-task with
off-task thoughts fit the data significantly worse than the three-factor model,
Δχ2(3) = 53.30, p < .001, χ2(77, N = 78) = 149.07, p < .001, CFI = .83, SRMR
= .09, RMSEA = .11. The average variance extracted (AVE) of the on-task
thoughts, self-evaluative off-task thoughts, and general mind-wandering
scales was .56, .34, and .65, respectively. The composite reliability (CR) of the
on-task thoughts, self-evaluative off-task thoughts, and general mind-
wandering scales was .83, .70, and .68, respectively. As expected, on-task
thoughts were highly and negatively correlated with self-evaluative off-task
thoughts (−.71) and with general mind-wandering (−.64). Self-evaluative off-
task thoughts were highly correlated with general mind-wandering (.65).
Overall, the current results indicate acceptable measurement properties of the
scales used.
Control Variables. We controlled for gaming experience because more
experienced participants likely find it easier to stay task-focused than less
experienced participants, which in turn could affect their on-task and off-task
thoughts ratings. Gaming experience was measured with three items: “How
often do you play computer games in general?” (1 = almost never to 5 = every
day), “Have you ever played a similar game before (e.g. Lemmings?)” (0 =
yes, 1 = no), and “How experienced do you consider yourself in playing these
kinds of games?” (1 = beginner to 5 = expert). In addition, in all analyses we
also controlled for sex.
Manipulation Check. As a manipulation check at the end of the study we
asked all participants if they could recall what strategy to handle errors we
had recommended to them at the beginning of the study. Participants could
choose among four options: error management, error prevention, another
strategy, and “not sure”. Three participants who could not properly recall
which text they had read were removed from all subsequent analyses.
Results
Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations for the
experimental variables. Because making errors was integral to our theorising
we wanted to establish whether participants in both conditions indeed made
errors during the game. For this purpose, we calculated the number of all
penguins lost as well as the number of level repetitions, both of which can be
seen as consequences of errors that were made. The total number of penguins
lost ranged between 21 and 147 with a mean of 72.21 (SD = 27.10). The mean
number of level repetitions was 2.63 (SD = 1.79). There were no differences
between conditions on the total number of penguins lost, F(1, 73) = 0.36, p =
.552, η2p = 0.01, Cohen’s d = −0.14, or on the number of level repetitions, F(1,
76) = 0.20, p = .897, η2p = 0.00, Cohen’s d = −0.03. Based on these results we
can conclude that the task induced errors independently of condition.
On-Task Thoughts. We predicted that participants in the error manage-
ment condition would have more on-task thoughts than participants in the
error prevention condition. An ANCOVA showed that participants in the
error management condition (M = 4.34; SD = 0.62) reported having more
on-task thoughts than participants in the error prevention condition (M =
4.04; SD = 0.66), F(1, 72) = 4.54, p = .037, η2p = 0.06, Cohen’s d = 0.48
(Hypothesis 1 supported). There was also a significant effect of playing games
in general, F(1, 72) = 5.11, p = .027, η2p = 0.07.
Off-Task Thoughts. A MANCOVA (using Pillai’s trace) showed no sig-
nificant effect of error instructions on off-task thoughts, V = 0.03, F(2, 71) =
1.20, p = .307 (Cohen’s ds were −0.35 and −0.15 for self-evaluative and
general mind-wandering off-task thoughts, respectively). Thus, participants
who received error management instructions did not report fewer off-task
thoughts than those who received error prevention instructions (Hypothesis
2 not supported).
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Discussion
As expected, Experiment 1 showed that participants who received error
management instructions found it easier to focus on the task than partici-
pants who received error prevention instructions. No effect of error instruc-
tions on off-task thoughts was found. It is possible that because the task was
highly engaging there was little opportunity for off-task thoughts. This limi-
tation is addressed in Experiment 2 by incorporating short breaks (cf.
Kanfer, Ackerman, Murtha, Dugdale, & Nelson, 1994) allowing participants
to “wander off” the task.
In Experiment 1 we selected a task during which—as is the case in real
life—it was not always obvious if and when an error was made. Although
using such a task increases the ecological validity of the experiment, it has the
potential limitation that participants may have been unaware of an error if it
did not immediately result in losing a penguin. This limitation is addressed in
Experiment 2 by selecting a task that provides an error message immediately
after an error occurs.
EXPERIMENT 2
Method
Participants and Design. The final sample consisted of 76 participants;
all but one were students at the university of the first author (42 females and
34 males; Mage = 21.39, SD = 3.22). Participants were recruited in the same
way as for Experiment 1. Participants were quasi-randomly (i.e. equal pro-
portion of males and females per condition) assigned to either the error
management (20 females and 19 males) or the error prevention condition (22
females and 15 males). Four participants in the initial sample were removed
from all analyses: one participant was not reading the instructions/questions
and three participants indicated to the experimenter during and after the
experiment that they were not proficient with computers. All participants
received €10 for taking part in the research.
Procedure. Experiment 2 lasted approximately 90 minutes. Participants
were seated in separate cubicles and were told that most instructions and all
questions would appear on the computer screen. In order to increase the
chance that participants would read the manipulation carefully we presented
them with a cover story. Namely, we told participants that we would first
collect data on their personality, after which we would suggest to them a
strategy that fits with their personality to use during the subsequent task.
Simulation task: The task used was a free-source PC simulation called
Train Dispatcher 2.0© (Signal Computer Consultants, 1997). In this simula-
tion, a participant acts as a train dispatcher who guides trains from their
entry to their exit location. A useful feature of the simulation was that if
participants made an error they would immediately receive an error message
(however, no error message was shown if participants sent a train to the
wrong end destination, but only if participants were using the wrong signals
and switches or trying to do something impossible). Participants could
choose to speed up or slow down the simulation with a time multiplier. Faster
speeds made the simulation more challenging and added extra points to the
final score. The software automatically calculated the scores.
Task familiarisation: All participants were presented with identical basic
instructions outlining how to use the signals and switches, start and stop the
simulation, zoom in and out, and check train destinations. Participants were
then informed that the main goal was to guide as many trains as possible to
their correct end destinations as quickly as possible. After reading the
instructions participants had an opportunity to familiarise themselves with
the simulation for five minutes by guiding a train from its start to its end
destination. The experimenter gave participants a handout with detailed
instructions on what the train number was, where the train would appear
and where the train should be directed to. In addition, participants received
a handout with the general task instructions presented before the familiari-
sation trial. Participants worked on this first task for 5 minutes. If within
5 minutes participants did not manage to guide the train to its end desti-
nation the experimenter showed them how the task could be successfully
completed.
Manipulation error approach: After the task familiarisation stage partici-
pants saw a screen indicating that based on their personality they should
follow the strategy mentioned next, which was the error approach manipu-
lation. The manipulations were identical to those in Experiment 1 with the
exception of a few minor word changes to improve wording and connect the
manipulation to the cover story.
Manipulation check: After reading the manipulation text we asked partici-
pants to write a short summary (maximum of 200 words) explaining the
strategy mentioned in the text they had previously read. The summaries were
coded by two independent coders, knowledgeable on the error approach
literature (both coders belonged to a research group investigating errors that
the first and second authors are a part of), but blind to experimental condi-
tion. The two coders had 100 per cent agreement on the type of strategy
described by participants (management or prevention). For all participants,
the summaries, as coded by the coders, matched the condition that partici-
pants were assigned to, indicating that all participants had read the
manipulation.
Practice: After the manipulations were administered, all participants
began their task practice, consisting of two 10-minute trials separated by a
2-minute break. During the practice all participants were provided with a
train schedule outlining when trains would appear on the screen (in simula-
tion time) and what their start and end destination was, as well as a copy of
the full simulation manual (including all available information on the simu-
lation, not only the basic information provided during the familiarisation
trial).
On- and off-task thoughts: After the completion of the practice trials all
participants had a 2-minute break before filling in the measures of on- and
off-task thoughts, which were identical to the measures used in Experiment 1.
All ratings were made on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to
7 (very much so). Cronbach’s alphas were .89, .75, and .83 for on-task
thoughts, self-evaluative off-task thoughts, and general mind-wandering,
respectively.
Performance: Following the on-task and off-task thoughts measures, par-
ticipants completed two 10-minute performance trials, which were described
as an opportunity to show what participants had learned (cf. Keith & Frese,
2005). Participants were instructed to guide as many trains as possible to their
correct end destinations. The first 10-minute performance trial measured
analogical transfer. The task in the analogical transfer trial had a level of
difficulty comparable to that in the practice phase and involved similar
procedures. The final score of the first performance trial was used as the
measure of analogical transfer performance.
After a 2-minute break participants worked on the second 10-minute
performance trial, measuring adaptive transfer. The task in the adaptive
transfer trial was more difficult than both the practice and the analogical
transfer trials. The task included a more complex track territory with a
higher number of tracks and trains, as well as new instruments and rules,
which required participants to update their previously created mental
model of the task (i.e. the novel elements considerably changed how the
simulation behaved as compared to the previous sessions; see Bell &
Kozlowski, 2008; Keith & Frese, 2005). The final score of the second per-
formance trial was used as a measure of adaptive transfer performance. To
provide additional motivation to perform during the performance trials,
participants were told that the person with the highest score would receive
€50.
Control Variables. None of the participants indicated having prior expe-
rience with the specific simulation task used (“Have you ever played this
simulation before?”, yes vs. no). Prior experience with similar tasks was
measured with one item: “Do you have previous experience with similar
tasks?” (1 = not at all, 7 = a lot of experience). In addition, we included an item
measuring participants’ agreement with the cover story, “Did you think the
strategy we suggested for you fits you?”(1 = not at all, 7 = completely). Finally,
in all analyses we controlled for sex.
Results
Table 2 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations. To test
whether the task was successful at inducing errors, we measured the number
of errors by calculating the number of error messages (M = 41.30; SD = 28.48)
participants saw during the two 10-minute practice trials. No differences
between conditions were found during practice trial 1, F(1, 72) = 2.25, p =
.138, η2p = 0.03, Cohen’s d = 0.35, or practice trial 2, F(1, 72) = 0.288, p = .589,
η2p = 0.00, Cohen’s d = 0.13. Also, the total number of error messages received
during the whole practice phase (practice trial 1 + 2) did not vary significantly
between conditions, F(1, 72) = 1.14, p = .29, η2p = 0.02, Cohen’s d = 0.25.
Based on these results we conclude that participants in the two conditions
made a similar number of errors during the practice phase.
Main Effects. On-task thoughts: An ANCOVA showed a main effect of
condition on on-task thoughts, F(1, 71) = 4.71, p = .033, η2p = 0.06, Cohen’s
d = −0.50. Consistent with Experiment 1, error management (M = 5.81; SD
=1.05) resulted in more on-task thoughts than did error prevention (M = 5.21;
SD =1.07; Hypothesis 1 supported). There was also a significant effect of
perceived fit of the suggested strategy with one’s personality on on-task
thoughts, F(1, 72) = 6.26, p = .015, η2p = 0.08, Cohen’s d = 0.57.
Off-task thoughts: A MANCOVA (using Pillai’s trace) showed no signifi-
cant effect for condition, V = 0.06, F(2, 70) = 2.10, p = .131, η2p = 0.06
(Cohen’s d self-evaluative off-task thoughts = −0.43; Cohen’s d general mind-
wandering off-task thoughts = 0.19). There was a significant effect of the
covariate perceived fit of the suggested strategy with one’s personality on
off-task thoughts, V = 0.18, F(2, 70) = 7.66, p = .001, η2p = 0.18, driven by the
variable’s effect on general mind-wandering, F(1, 71) = 15.13, p < .001, η2p =
0.18. The current findings indicate that participants who received error man-
agement instructions did not have fewer off-task thoughts compared to
participants who received error prevention instructions (Hypothesis 2 not
supported).
Practice performance: An ANCOVA showed no effect of condition on the
first 10-minute practice score, F(1, 69) = 0.92, p = .341, η2p = 0.01, Cohen’s d
= −0.22. However, error management participants performed significantly
better than error prevention participants (M = 0.27; SD = 1.03 vs.M = −0.28;
SD = 0.90, standardised scores) on the second 10-minute practice trial, F(1,
71) = 5.16, p = .027, η2p = 0.07, Cohen’s d = −0.52.
Analogical transfer performance: An ANCOVA showed a main effect of
condition on analogical transfer performance, F(1, 71) = 7.69, p = .007, η2p =
0.10, Cohen’s d = −0.64. Supporting Hypothesis 3, error management
resulted in better analogical transfer performance than error prevention (M
= 0.30; SD = 1.17 vs. M = −0.32; SD = 0.65, standardised scores).
TA
B
LE
2
M
ea
n
s,
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
D
ev
ia
ti
o
n
s,
an
d
C
o
rr
el
at
io
n
s
b
et
w
ee
n
S
tu
d
y
Va
ri
ab
le
s
in
E
xp
er
im
en
t
2
V
ar
ia
bl
e
E
rr
or
M
an
ag
em
en
t
E
rr
or
P
re
ve
nt
io
n
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
M
SD
M
SD
1.
C
on
di
ti
on
–
–
–
–
–
2.
A
ge
21
.0
5
2.
55
21
.7
6
3.
80
−.
11
–
3.
Se
x
0.
51
0.
51
0.
59
0.
50
−.
08
.0
9
–
4.
P
ri
or
ex
pe
ri
en
ce
w
it
h
si
m
ila
r
si
m
ul
at
io
ns
1.
97
1.
48
2.
05
1.
43
−.
03
−.
08
−.
16
–
5.
P
er
ce
iv
ed
fit
be
tw
ee
n
su
gg
es
te
d
st
ra
te
gy
an
d
on
e’
s
pe
rs
on
al
it
y
4.
18
1.
62
3.
70
1.
56
.1
5
−.
23
*
−.
15
.0
3
–
6.
O
n-
ta
sk
th
ou
gh
ts
5.
81
1.
05
5.
21
1.
07
.2
8*
−.
24
*
.0
0
.0
4
.3
1*
*
–
7.
Se
lf
-e
va
lu
at
iv
e
of
f-
ta
sk
th
ou
gh
ts
3.
32
1.
11
3.
83
1.
23
−.
21
†
.2
5*
.1
5
−.
08
.0
3
−.
33
**
–
8.
G
en
er
al
m
in
d-
w
an
de
ri
ng
3.
21
1.
68
3.
68
1.
70
−.
14
.0
3
−.
10
.0
9
−.
41
**
−.
40
**
*
−.
04
–
9.
P
ra
ct
ic
e
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
af
te
r
10
m
in
ut
es
0.
16
1.
08
−0
.1
7
0.
90
.1
6
−.
18
−.
19
.1
1
.2
5*
.3
0*
−.
03
−.
21
–
10
.
P
ra
ct
ic
e
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
af
te
r
20
m
in
ut
es
(e
nd
of
pr
ac
ti
ce
)
0.
27
1.
03
−0
.2
8
0.
90
.2
8*
−.
25
*
−.
16
.1
2
.1
5
.4
0*
**
−.
19
†
−.
23
*
.8
5*
**
–
11
.
A
na
lo
gi
ca
lt
ra
ns
fe
r
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
0.
30
1.
17
−0
.3
2
0.
65
.3
1*
*
−.
15
−.
14
.2
0†
.0
9
.3
0*
*
−.
18
−.
09
.6
2*
**
.8
1*
*
–
12
.
A
da
pt
iv
e
tr
an
sf
er
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
21
.0
5
2.
55
21
.7
6
3.
80
.2
7*
−.
19
−.
24
*
.1
0
.1
8
.3
0*
*
−.
15
−.
03
.4
2*
**
.5
6*
**
.6
5*
**
–
13
.
N
um
be
r
of
er
ro
r
m
es
sa
ge
s
du
ri
ng
pr
ac
ti
ce
1.
51
0.
51
1.
59
0.
50
−.
13
.1
2
.0
1
−.
09
−.
01
−.
30
**
.1
5
.1
4
−.
31
**
−.
34
**
−.
22
†
−.
11
N
ot
e:
†
p
<
.1
0;
*
p
<
.0
5;
**
p
<
.0
1;
**
*
p
<
.0
01
;a
ll
te
st
s
ar
e
tw
o-
ta
ile
d.
N
=
76
,e
xc
ep
t
fo
r
nu
m
be
r
of
er
ro
r
m
es
sa
ge
s
du
ri
ng
pr
ac
ti
ce
an
d
pr
ac
ti
ce
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
af
te
r
10
m
in
ut
es
,f
or
w
hi
ch
N
=
74
.E
rr
or
pr
ev
en
ti
on
=
0
an
d
er
ro
r
m
an
ag
em
en
t=
1.
Se
x
co
de
s
0
=
m
an
an
d
1
=
w
om
an
.P
ri
or
ex
pe
ri
en
ce
w
it
h
si
m
ila
r
si
m
ul
at
io
ns
,p
er
ce
iv
ed
fit
be
tw
ee
n
su
gg
es
te
d
st
ra
te
gy
an
d
on
e’
s
pe
rs
on
al
it
y,
on
-t
as
k
th
ou
gh
ts
,a
nd
of
f-
ta
sk
th
ou
gh
ts
w
er
e
m
ea
su
re
d
on
a
7-
po
in
ts
ca
le
.P
ra
ct
ic
e
sc
or
e,
an
al
og
ic
al
tr
an
sf
er
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
sc
or
e,
an
d
ad
ap
ti
ve
tr
an
sf
er
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
sc
or
e
ar
e
re
po
rt
ed
w
it
h
st
an
da
rd
is
ed
va
lu
es
.
Adaptive transfer performance: An ANCOVA showed a main effect of
condition on adaptive transfer performance, F(1, 71) = 4.53, p = .037, η2p =
0.06, Cohen’s d = −0.49, with error management resulting in better adaptive
transfer performance than error prevention (M = 0.26; SD = 1.14 vs. M =
−0.27; SD = 0.74, standardised scores; Hypothesis 4 supported).
Mediation Analyses. To conduct the mediation analyses we used
Preacher and Hayes’ (2008) SPSS multiple mediation script with a 5,000
bootstrap resample. The script allows multiple mediators to be entered simul-
taneously and automatically calculates bias-corrected and accelerated confi-
dence intervals. All mediation analyses included the control variables.
Analogical transfer performance: The total indirect effect of all proposed
mediators assessed simultaneously was not significant, B = 0.07, SE = 0.04,
95% CI [−0.004, 0.18], which could be expected based on the lack of corre-
lation between the off-task thoughts measures and error approach or transfer
performance. When examining the mediators individually, results indicated
that only on-task thoughts mediated the effect of error approach on analogi-
cal transfer performance, B = 0.06, SE = 0.04, 95% CI [0.01, 0.18]. Hypothesis
5a was supported. Self-evaluative off-task thoughts, B = 0.004, SE = 0.03,
95% CI [−0.05, 0.08], and general off-task thoughts, B = 0.0003, SE = 0.02,
95% CI [−0.04, 0.04], were not mediators (Hypothesis 6a not supported).
Adaptive transfer performance: The total indirect effect of all proposed
mediators tested simultaneously was not significant, B = 0.05, SE = 0.05, 95%
CI [−0.05, 0.15]. Examination of individual mediators, however, showed that
on-task thoughts mediated the effect of error approach on adaptive transfer
performance, B = 0.06, SE = 0.04, 95% CI [0.01, 0.19], supporting Hypothesis
5b. Self-evaluative off-task thoughts, B = −0.003, SE = 0.04, 95% CI [−0.13,
0.05], and general off-task thoughts, B = −0.01, SE = 0.03, 95% CI [−0.09,
0.02], were not mediators (Hypothesis 6b not supported).
Discussion
Experiment 2 replicated the finding of Experiment 1 that error management
results in more on-task thoughts than does error prevention. In addition,
confirming our predictions, error management resulted in both better ana-
logical and adaptive transfer performance. Interestingly, we found a main
effect of error instructions on practice performance that was not expected.
Separate tests of performance in the first and second part of the practice task
showed that participants in both conditions performed similarly during the
first 10 minutes of practice while performance differences became apparent
during the second 10 minutes. A possible explanation for this finding is that
10 minutes were enough for participants to develop task-relevant declarative
knowledge—the knowledge of rules and skills necessary to do a task (Kanfer
& Ackerman, 1989) resulting in improved scores in the error management
condition. Finally, our analyses showed that on-task thoughts mediated the
effects of error instructions on both analogical and adaptive transfer perfor-
mance, whereas off-task thoughts did not.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The current studies extend prior knowledge of cognition as a mediator of the
effects of error approach on performance (e.g. Keith & Frese, 2005). Overall,
our findings show that error management instructions promote both ana-
logical and adaptive transfer performance by activating more on-task
thoughts than error prevention instructions. The results indicate that error
management enhances performance not by minimising task-undirected (off-
task) thoughts, but by making it more likely that people focus on the task at
hand.
Theoretical and Methodological Implications
Our findings both replicate and extend previous research (e.g. Bell &
Kozlowski, 2008; Frese et al., 1991; Heimbeck et al., 2003; Keith & Frese,
2005, 2008; Nordstrom et al., 1998). We build on Keith and Frese’s (2005)
idea that error approach affects performance by influencing cognitive func-
tioning (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989) by a more positive reappraisal of errors
under error management instructions than under error prevention instruc-
tions (also see Richards & Gross, 2000). We extend Keith and Frese’s
research by showing that on-task thoughts mediate the effect of error
approach on performance, while off-task thoughts do not.
According to earlier reasoning, stress andworry caused by error occurrence
negatively affect cognition, directing thoughts away from the task (e.g. Frese
et al., 1991; Heimbeck et al., 2003; Keith & Frese, 2005; Nordstrom et al.,
1998). In line with this reasoning, we expected that error prevention instruc-
tions would cultivate off-task thoughts, and harm performance. Instead, our
results suggest that error management leads to more on-task thoughts, while
off-task thoughts are not affected by error approach. The important implica-
tion of these findings is that subsequent theorising should focus less on the
potential negative effects of error prevention on cognition (more off-task
thoughts), and more on the positive effects of error management on on-task
thoughts. Put differently, the mechanisms explaining the effects of error
approach on performance may be positive, rather than negative.
We extend the work of Keith and Frese (2005) and Nordstrom et al. (1998)
by using manipulations that vary on error approach only. Specifically, we
kept the manipulation length similar in both conditions, framed both error
management and error prevention strategies positively, and informed
participants in both conditions that the respective strategy was good for
learning and performance. In addition, the manipulations we used are easier
and faster to administer, making their application to real-life contexts less
complex. With this more parsimonious error approach manipulation, we
nonetheless replicate prior performance effects (Keith & Frese, 2008), attest-
ing to the robustness of the superiority of error management over error
prevention.
We carefully selected the tasks we used in the current studies so as to ensure
that they would not favor either management or prevention. In addition, in
earlier research, the error management group typically received error-based
practice while the error prevention group received errorless practice (Bell &
Kozlowski, 2008; Heimbeck et al., 2003; Keith & Frese, 2008). In the current
research, in contrast, participants in both the error management and the
error prevention condition were offered the opportunity for exploratory task
practice. Our results indicate that the usefulness of errors during practice
depends on whether people receive error management or error prevention
instructions. Even though the error management and the error prevention
groups made a similar number of errors during practice, the error manage-
ment group was better able to stay task-focused and learn from the errors
resulting in better analogical and adaptive transfer performance. Accord-
ingly, the combination of making errors and being able to reappraise them as
learning opportunities seems to make error management more effective than
error prevention (also see Heimbeck et al., 2003).
Limitations
A possible limitation is related to the measurement of on- and off-task
thoughts. Like others (e.g. Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989; Keith & Frese, 2005),
we measured cognition with self-report items. However, other measures may
be better suited to capture on- and off-task thoughts. Future work could
attempt to address this issue by measuring on- and off-task thoughts by
asking participants to say out loud what they are thinking about during the
practice itself. Nonetheless, the speaking out loud procedure has its own
limitations: people are not always capable of verbalising their thoughts and
speaking may take attention away from the task itself, resulting in more
off-task thoughts.
Second, it can be argued that our measure of on-task thoughts shows some
similarities with the concept of emotion control (Keith & Frese, 2005).
On-task thoughts and self-regulation, however, are theoretically distinct.
Emotion control refers to the self-regulation part of Kanfer and Ackerman’s
(1989) cognitive resource allocation model, reflecting changes in resource
allocation. Our measure, in contrast, represents on-task thoughts not
changes in resource allocation. Nevertheless, future work should include
both measures of on-task thoughts and self-regulation simultaneously so that
their effects can be compared.
Third, another potential limitation of the current research is the measure-
ment of both analogical and adaptive transfer performance after the practice
phase. Although the current procedure was purposefully selected because it
has been validated in previous research (see Bell & Kozlowski, 2008), we
cannot rule out the possibility that it induced habituation in participants.
This issue should be addressed in future research by forming separate per-
formance groups: one group with only an analogical transfer performance
trial after the practice phase and a second group with only an adaptive
transfer performance trial after the practice phase.
Finally, the effects of error approach over time should be tested using a
longitudinal design. Based on existing research, it is unclear how long per-
formance benefits last. Although some previous work has investigated the
effects of error approach on performance a week after training (e.g.
Heimbeck et al., 2003), to the best of our knowledge no experimental study
has tested performance on multiple occasions over a longer term.
Practical Implications and Future Research
A potentially important practical implication of our findings is that even brief
error management instructions improve people’s ability to stay task-focused
and to manage whatever goes wrong. Error management may thus increase
the efficiency of job-training and benefit task performance. The manipula-
tions used in both studies were only three paragraphs long, yet the partici-
pants who received error management instructions performed better than the
participants who received error prevention instructions. Incorporating error-
framing instructions while instructing people to do a new task in the work-
place (or elsewhere) is simple, easy, and efficient, and the increases in
performance can be beneficial to both individuals and organisations.
To test whether the effects of error management instructions on on-task
thoughts and performance can be generalised to the workplace, our findings
should be tested in an organisational setting, using a quasi-experimental
design. Previous research by Van Dyck and colleagues (2005) provided evi-
dence that organisational error management culture was positively linked to
firm goal achievement and profitability. Note that the research by Van Dyck
and colleagues involved overall performance based on how companies per-
formed on both new and established tasks. We can speculate that error
management instructions may be beneficial to performance not only on new,
but also on well-learned, tasks that employees perform. Such a suggestion,
however, should be regarded as speculative. More research on the effects
of error approach instructions for both novel and well-learned tasks is
warranted.
An interesting question that remains to be answered is whether our find-
ings can be generalised to tasks with different levels of difficulty within
organisations. While some tasks are simple and routine, others are complex
and difficult to learn. Experimental non-field research indicates that the
benefits of error management for learning and performance mainly become
apparent for difficult but not for simple tasks (Frese et al., 1991). To the
extent that error management can help people stay task-focused, as indicated
by our results, it may also be beneficial to long-term performance even on
simple tasks. Future research should investigate this possibility.
Another interesting question is whether error management is always supe-
rior to prevention. What we argue is not that making errors per se is good,
but rather that error management allows people to handle the existing errors
so that their negative consequences are minimised. Error management
differentiates the error from its consequences and attempts to control the
latter, whereas error prevention tries to evade the negative consequences by
eradicating errors per se (Hofmann & Frese, 2011). Both prevention and
management are important to organisations. Errors, however, cannot be
fully eradicated (Reason, 1990) and it is when prevention fails that error
management becomes vital for trapping errors and minimising their negative
consequences.
Finally, the current findings suggest that being able to focus on the task is
what makes error management particularly effective in improving perfor-
mance. Although more research applying error instructions in real organisa-
tions is necessary, our findings indicate that error management can be
beneficial not only because it helps people with tasks similar to those previ-
ously practiced, but also because it teaches people how to successfully master
errors and handle new problems. In line with Bell and Kozlowski (2008), we
argue that it is not possible to prepare employees for everything that can
potentially go wrong. Organisational environments are becoming increas-
ingly less predictable and more complex, necessitating that people become
more adaptive, flexible, and efficient. In addition, staying task-focused with
all the present-day distractions is progressively more challenging. We suggest
that error management can aid organisations in producing the type of resil-
ient employee who can stay task-focused and successfully adapt quickly to
new situations and problems.
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SAPPENDIX: ITEMS USED IN EXPERIMENTS 1 AND 2
On-task thoughts items (self-developed, based on
Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989 and Keith & Frese, 2005)
I found it easy to concentrate on the task.
I found it easy to keep thinking about what I was supposed to do.
My mind was busy with solving the task.
It was easy to get over a problem and get back to the task.
I could keep my mind on the task.
It was easy to concentrate on what I was doing.
Off-task thought items (adapted from Sarason et al.,
1986)
Self-evaluative off-task thoughts items (based on the distinction of off-task
thoughts by Yee, Hsieh-Yee, Pierce, Grome, & Schantz (2004))
I thought about how poorly I was doing.
I thought about how I should work more carefully.
I thought about my level of ability.
I thought about how I would feel if I were told how I performed.
I thought about how often I got confused.
I thought about what the experimenter would think of me.
General mind-wandering (adapted from Sarason et al., 1986)
To what degree did your mind wonder off the task?
While playing the game did you have any other things going through your
mind besides thoughts about the game (e.g. did you think about what you
would be doing later today, your friends or family, something you found
funny, some homework or assignment you should work on)? (Self-developed
item combining multiple items from the original Sarason et al., 1986, scale.)
Control Variables Experiment 1
How often do you play computer games in general? (1 = almost never to
5 = every day)
Have you ever played a similar game before (e.g. Lemmings?) (0 = yes,
1 = no)
How experienced do you consider yourself in playing these kinds of
games? (1 = beginner to 5 = expert)
What is your sex? (0 = man, 1 = woman)
Control Variables Experiment 2
Have you ever played this simulation task before? (yes vs. no).
Do you have previous experience with similar tasks? (1 = not at all, 7 = a
lot of experience).
Did you think the strategy we suggested for you fits you? (1 = not at all, 7
= completely).
What is your sex? (0 = man, 1 = woman)
Manipulation Check Experiment 1
Which strategy did we recommend you?
“To err is human”, “Errors really are not that bad”, and “Try to learn as
much as you can from your errors!”
“Better safe than sorry”, “Mistakes can be prevented through diligence”,
and “It is crucial to work faultlessly!”
“Another strategy”
“Not sure”
Manipulation Check Experiment 2
Make a short summary (minimum 50, maximum 200 words) of the strategy
you received and mention its most important parts.
Note: The on-task and off-task thoughts items were presented in random
order during both experiments. In Experiment 1 the response scale ranged
from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much so). In Experiment 2 the response scale
ranged from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much so).
